

4

SOME
REASONS
FOR

SERIOUS CANDOR

IN RELATION TO
VULGAR DECISIONS
CONCERNING

PEACE or WAR.

In a LETTER to a FRIEND.

LONDON:

Printed for C. HENDERSON under the Royal Exchange,
and sold at the Pamphlet Shops.

MDCCLXII.

SOME

REASONS

FOR

SERIOUS CANDOR

IN RELATION TO

VOLUNTARY DECISIONS



CONSTITUTION

PEACE OF WAR.

IN A LETTER TO A FRIEND.

LONDON:

Printed by C. H. Sturges, 10, Abchurch Lane, E.C. 4.

and sold at the following prices.

MS. C. 1. 1. 1.

[1]

R E A S O N S

FOR A

P E A C E.

To -----, Esq;

My very good and much honored Friend,

I WAS really surprized last night, to hear a man of your understanding, who loves his country so sincerely, talk so warmly on the side of protracting the War, without qualifying one sentiment with a supposition, that possibly you might be mistaken in regard to the true interest of your country. You have seen more years, and more wars than I have; but you live among those who are more interested in point of *profit* by war than I am, and therefore I will suppose myself to stand on equal ground with you.

B

I ob-

I observe, the Press groans under a load of *solicitations for war*; but there seems to be no sober reasoning in it. These writers, whatever their rank, condition, or motives may be, as well as the talking advocates for war, all argue as if events were absolutely in our hands; and that, if we acted in a certain manner, which manner they suppose to be doing as we have done before, and spent another *twenty millions*, now that we are in the train of spending, we might in such case secure our object, and France be *never* able to molest us again. The foundation of this opinion I believe to be extremely false and erroneous, and the difficulties much greater than these gentlemen imagine.

If I understand the matter right, you sanguine politicians would not make peace with France and Spain, but fight it out to the last drop of blood, and the last penny, rather than not keep *Martinico*, or *Guadaloupe*, if not *Cuba*, if we can get it; and rather than permit the French to fish in any manner in the North American seas.

You say, *you only mean to go a prudent length*. The question is, Have we not already gone as far as prudence will warrant, unless constrained by

by necessity? For *necessity* gives new names and attributes to things, and makes that prudence, which would otherwise be folly.

The opinion in favor of holding one of these sugar islands, and not permitting a fishery, is entertained by a considerable part of the inhabitants of this metropolis, and I believe by many others also; but they have not yet *examined the true merits of the cause*.

However prevalent this opinion may be, *for the day*, I cannot grant that one man in five hundred, who talks or writes, is really a good politician, and takes in the whole of our connexions, or sees the true state of them, as they now stand. Allow me this, and we shall gain time to recollect ourselves; and if we cannot trace out the whole truth, we may mark out the steps by which it is to be found.

That consciousness of *right* and *wrong*, which is the essence of rationality, is the great law by which every son of Adam is to stand or fall; and, in all worldly concerns, this will depend on circumstances. Right and Wrong in war, must be relative to the situation of the parties engaged in it: and to be able to judge, we

should divest ourselves of *prejudices*, as well as be thoughtful and intelligent.

We reckon without *our host* : How do you or I know that the enemy is to have any fishery ? or may it not be so confined as to be no object of terror ? How few reason impartially ! Are you a merchant, a contractor, a stock-jobber, a sailor, a soldier, or intimately connected with any who are of these professions ? Look round, and see what crowds are deeply interested, and how many are greatly enriched by the means that extremely impoverish their country.

All is not gold that glitters. Those who are thus enriched, depend on the public welfare. If our treasure, and even the wealth of generations to come, are anticipated and wasted, surely it may be said our country is impoverished ; and whatever accumulation of property you or I may make by seeing the children's children of our neighbours, in our debt ; it is the wealth of these which must support us in the secure possession of our property, or it will infallibly sink, and at length cease to be any property at all. *Paying off*, is the *great Science* we have *now* to learn.

You

You grant, *that great numbers see as through a glass darkly, and that many are interested in the continuance of the war, or biassed in their judgment by those who are.* And does not *ambition, or disappointed hope, warp the judgment of others, with regard to men in power?* Thus we are induced to condemn the measure, because we wish the ministers who have the direction of public affairs were displaced, to make room for *our friends.*

Let me ask you, if the glitter of arms, the din of war, national pride, and particularly our great success, do not lead many of us to think we can consistently *bold all*, though we have no adequate idea of the *good* which could result from it, if we were to hold it?

You confess, that *what is saved, is gained:* Have you estimated the amount of what will be *saved by peace?* Have you digested in your thoughts what dangers and losses our country may be exposed to, by a perseverance in carrying on so *expensive* a war?

As a commercial state, we ought, if possible, to live in friendship with all mankind. Should it ever become a maxim with us to conquer

quer and hold, we should always be in danger ourselves of being conquered. If other nations should conceive that the riches we acquire by trade is devoted to the bringing into subjection their possessions, what will be the consequence ?

You suppose all the *good* which can happen on your plan : I will make a rational estimate of the *evils* which may ensue. Thus we may bring our argument to some decision.

If you are not in a *good humor*, you will certainly not reason with freedom or candor. Suppose for a moment, that it is possible the war may be *now* brought to a *decent issue*. Upon further reflexion you may find that perchance it may be an *honorable* issue. If the issue is honorable, it is so far *profitable*. Then let us proceed a step further, and examine carefully whether the nation has not *gained* so much (supposing the terms reported to be near the truth) as to have infinite reason to thank heaven ? Certain it is, that such has been the care, wisdom, and intrepidity of ministers ; and the almost unparalleled bravery and conduct of our countrymen, and likewise the dismay of our enemies on most occasions, that we have abundant reason to exercise the *warmest* gratitude.

War

War is a game which differs from all others, for all the players may be, and generally are, great losers. The blood that is spilt, if it does not cry at the door of individuals, is such a proof of mens depravity, as requires the very chastisement that is found in war itself, in which we sow rapine and desolation; and poverty, misery, and death are the harvest: And a *glorious harvest* there has been in the present war; for it may be computed that near half a million of people have been actually destroyed by it in a direct view, and as many more in the consequences, though you and I have set at home, and seen nothing of it except a few wooden legs, or a battered French ship.

The issues of war are likewise precarious. The Great Disposer of events, often confounds the best concerted and most formidable Plans. We have seen this in the course of the present war, in the case of the enemies of the magnanimous king of Prussia, who has so wonderfully defended himself. We have beheld it in so many striking instances, as might make us cry out, in the flames of war, as the pretended atheist in the flames of a fire—O God!—And ought we not to be cautious of our conduct, and not expose ourselves wantonly! If there is a

4

God,

God, he must take cognizance of human affairs ; and we may easily learn from the history of mankind, that pride was not made for man.

You say, that *self-preservation is the first law in nature ; and that now is the time to crush our enemies, that we may not be crushed ourselves.* The first part I grant ; but upon the same general principle, I recommend to you not to become timid, and afraid of remote evils. Our leaders may perhaps see more dangers at our doors than we are aware of, and may guard us better than we should guard ourselves. Do not forget the common principles of human prudence, and be so intent on *future security*, as to risk the *present*.

Let us make war for *twenty years* to come, and have no men remain to *till* the earth, or throw the *shuttle*, we shall absolutely be in a worse state of *security*. Our security must arise, under Providence, from our political prudence and œconomy in time of peace ; in a due care of our brave countrymen ; and in a judicious disposition of some part of our gains, at a proper time, to those who are interested to assist us, and who will assist us effectually at a *compassible* expence.

Ask

Ask your own heart, if the subjugating a few people in Louisiana, who live five hundred miles from our settlements; or the additional revenue of 2 or 300,000 *l. per ann.* drawn from Martinico, can obtain this security? Let the number of men and sum of money be doubled, still we may pay a great deal too much for them. *Gold may be bought too dear.*

And how comes it that you think, now is the opportunity for doing such mighty things for our future security, beyond, what we ought to suppose, is done by the terms of the peace proposed? Give us Peru and Mexico, and throw Brazil into the bargain, we might still say, "is it possible this nation can bear so prodigious a drain, or be more enthralled by foreign connections, than it *now* is, both in Germany and in Portugal?"

Do you really imagine, that France would not be able to make war with us hereafter, if we were to keep Martinico? I apprehend you are mistaken. You recommend to apply the revenue of that island towards the paying off our debt: But you have not considered that it may cost us more to hold it, than its revenue will amount to. If the expence will probably ex-

ceed such amount, is it for the *good* we shall receive, that you desire to keep it, or that it will be so much loss to our enemies? The latter is a strong reason, but not equal to the weight of that which is opposed to it. The 1st question is, Will Martinico pay the interest of twenty or thirty millions Sterling (if you can find these millions) at 4 *per Cent.* with three or four millions into the bargain? The difference on the price of our stocks, such proportion, I mean, as is *bought* by foreigners, and again *sold out* by them, in time of peace, may amount to this sum. What profits foreigners have already made on us, in this war, is too shocking to think of at present. 2d, How can you be *sure* of keeping Martinico at last? 3d, What may happen to our credit in the mean while? *Lastly*, Are we no where *vulnerable*?

France has ample ports, good artificers, and large revenues: Could she not *build* ships without Martinico, and *man* them without a *fishery*? I know we are unwilling to believe this; many think it impossible; you may think so, if you please; but have you considered what an extensive coasting trade she enjoys, and what a large traffic to Turkey? Have you taken into the calculation the settlements

and possessions which the most sanguine of us would allow her in the East and West Indies? Have you considered what methods she takes to double-man her trading ships? Have you thought how men *may* be bred for action at sea, supposing it to be only for a short summers campaign? Is it not more probable she would apply a greater portion of her *revenue* to her marine, after being so very sorely provoked, and as it were enslaved by her losses, than under a moderate division of power?

These questions, *my friend*, deserve your *serious* consideration. On the other hand, shall we not bid fairer to acquire friends, having the reputation of moderation, than if we aspire, or, which may be the same, *seem* to other nations to aspire, at universal empire in commerce?

You say, *you only seek for security*. May not other nations say, "*Your security is our insecurity* ; and you must pardon us for assisting your enemies to check you, for fear you should run mad with power?" You confess *all this may be, but that it proves a great deal too much* : So it does, for the favorite scheme of protracting the war ; but for the greater scheme of political wisdom in promoting peace, and the

arts of it, such enquiries deserve our attention, and should render *such spectators as you and I*, more deliberate in our decisions.

I have been too much in the active scenes of life to have read a great deal ; but if you examine history I believe you will find, that national happiness and security have seldom arose from conquest and extended dominion. Heaven has been most indulgent to us ; shall we cast away the blessing, or *secure* it ? Shall we tempt providence to forsake us ? Consider the substantial advantages of the war : Have not these exceeded the expectations of the most sanguine patriot ? Except with regard to *our debt*, we are, humanly speaking, *secure*.

In our mother country, and in general, in his majesty's foreign *insular* dominions, we depend on our fleets, and our abilities to arm a great number of men in case of danger : And *our strength* may be estimated by our *enemies weakness*. In North America, as a continent, we depend on numbers also ; but we require such a natural barrier as it shall be impossible to mistake ; and by which, humanly speaking, it shall be out of the power of our enemies to disturb us. The question is, if these ends are
not

not already answered, or will be provided for by treaty? And if they are provided for, shall we not, to all appearance, remain in the quiet possession of a vast, fertile and extensive country, which was the great object of the war?

You will pardon me, Sir, but if you will have patience as a man of understanding, as well as a good subject, and not insist upon knowing, what you cannot know by any absolute demand, or without invading the King's prerogative; and what it may not be prudent for government to trust you with, even were our fellow-subjects all of one mind; you will soon see the event. That which is now an importunate curiosity, or a fear that our leaders will mislead us, may be a dangerous precedent were it gratified. Whilst we are talking so much of *security*, I beg you will consider that laws and government are our best security against all temporal evils.

Let us wait the result of council, and a *real* knowledge of public affairs. Remember that liberty is our most valuable inheritance. And whatever tends to obstruct the public measures, directed by council and knowledge,

as

as certainly leads to the insecurity of our liberty.

The most material question with me is, If all the fine things which may be pretended to, by the continuance of the war, can counterbalance the hazard and inconveniences of our children being the inheritors of a deeply mortgaged estate? Nations may be undone by their conquests. They frequently are so weakned by their victories, as in the issue to become the dupes of their own prowess.

Consider what we have gained. France envies, what I must beg leave to call, our secure possession of the vast continent of North America, *with Canada*. Few of us seem to know the value of the former. Have you, my friend, so soon forgotten the extended chain of the enemies forts, with the formidable and numerous garrisons they contained? Do you no longer remember, how it pleased the hand of the Almighty to assist us in passing through difficulties, which the utmost human efforts seemed hardly equal to? Call to mind Ticonderago, Crown-Point, Mont-Real, and, above all, our glorious struggle, and providential success at Quebec! Fix your eyes
and

and your heart on what we can keep, and may reasonably insist upon keeping, and let us *now* settle the boundaries of our territories by lakes, rivers, and mountains. Let us clearly ascertain what we challenge by right of discovery, by possession, and by treaty; and what is there to *fear*? Let us establish a good government in that country, and what have we not to *hope* for from it? Have you considered the great importance of it, from numbers of inhabitants, and their ability to double those numbers in twenty-five, or at most thirty years? May they not go on till they have cultivated the whole country, and rendered it more valuable than Peru, Mexico, and Brazil? This is so true in fact, that in Britain, without gold or silver, we are much richer and securer, by the force of industry and fertility, than those who have more of these metals in their mines, than might purchase (so far as money will go) all the kingdoms in Europe.

If, amidst our victories, we indulge a childish pusillanimity, may we not as well suppose, that the North Americans will grow so great, as to shake off their connexions with their mother-country, as that the French can do us any material mischief from Louisiana? Which is the
most

most probable event? We say, the North Americans will be formidable in themselves, and in the same breath, they will be *overwhelmed* by the inroads of the French. Is not this *taking pains* to find an object to startle at, as if we *delighted in fear*?

See where Louisiana lies, and how it may rather become an object of jealousy to Spain, by commerce with Mexico. If the French encrease their military power in that country, or in the part of it which may remain with them, the Mexicans will take the alarm; and the family-compact operate to no better effect in America, than it has done in Europe. What that compact can do against the genius of Spaniards, and our natural products which they want, I know not; I fancy the Spaniards will hardly submit to trade with one nation only, disadvantageously, when they can trade with another also to their great emolument.

Establish a right government in North America, and, without lighting up the flames of war in Europe, the inhabitants will be able to repel all violence. The French will not dare to disturb them in the quiet possession of their pasturage, and agriculture, and all
the

the glorious fruits of peace. It will be soon discovered if they should intrigue with the Indians; and the inhabitants, under the king's governors and generals, may win them by kindness, or repay injuries with ample vengeance, and this will be the shortest way of *keeping peace*.

If the French do presume to molest us directly or indirectly, by the natives of the country, it is very hard if we have not learnt how to keep peace, now that we have so great a superiority.

The *secure possession of North America* I reckon as the great reward of our toils in the present war. And what think you of the *reputation* we have acquired for national strength and prowess? Has not the whole earth been astonished? Are we not amazed at ourselves? But we may easily go on till we are also amazed why we were not *contented*? In common life 'tis a great point for men to know when they are well. Shall we hazard the losing these advantages by the uncertain events of war, and by wasting our natural strength, which last is a certain consequence, though you do not see it with your naked eye.

If we behave with propriety in peace, what nation upon earth will chuse to quarrel with us for years to come? And if we do not behave consistently, what will conquests signify, but with a lesser force to lay us open in more quarters, and make it impossible to guard ourselves? If the French or Spaniards, or any other power, should quarrel with us hereafter; sufficient for the day will be the evils of it. Let us convince the world of our moderation in victory, as well as our ability to be victorious. Let us preserve our *power*, not waste it, and they will court our friendship, and support us in our strength. Omnipotence itself will befriend our cause!—A thirst of conquest has never been rewarded with temporal happiness, nor wide extended empire long governable, but often tended to its own dissolution, from the very cause of its being unweildy.

You say, *The French are the disturbers of mankind.* Their genius indeed leads them too much to war, and we see the consequences. They brought this war on themselves, and are exhausted by it: They enticed the Spaniards, who may now find that it will be best for them not to quarrel with us hereafter. Shall we preserve ourselves in that opinion, or trust to nothing

thing but the *sword*? I have somewhere read, that those who live *only by the sword*, are very subject to perish by it.

Consider further, that we have reduced the marine of France, sunk her treasures, deprived her of her trade, plunged her into debt, and destroyed her credit. What is the most grievous loss of all, in the estimation of reasoning politicians, is the destruction of such numbers of her ablest people in Germany, that she will feel it for thirty years to come. In the West Indies we have shewn the French what we can do, with the assistance of the North Americans. I suppose we shall gain some advantage by the islands said to be ceded to us. In Africa, perhaps we may do the same. In Asia they are humbled to the dust; proud Pondicherry is no more! I do not hear any one say they are to have any fortifications in the Ganges; if so, it is likewise of no small importance.

In regard to the *Fishery*, which you lay the greatest stress upon, it seems, from the nature of it, to be an object for which the war must be protracted, God knows how long, if we insist on a total exclusion. I have no other reasons to justify my opinion, but I apprehend

hend that other coasts abound in fish, and that they would seek it till they found it, and make seamen. In the mean while, the mischief to us, as to foreign markets, is not near so great as you imagine. *And why do we not fish more on our own coast?*

If we attempt to crush the power of France, by a total prevention of her fishery, we may in the issue bring on the evils we dread, so much the sooner. This is a bold thought; but I know the several methods the French take to breed seamen. And if providence has so ordained, that we shall be compelled to fight them again in ten, or twenty years, I hope we shall not then be so much in debt; and learn how to strike quicker, with less expence, and less encumbered with European continental connexions.

Among others, I reckon it as a great acquisition in the present war, that we have learnt, in a more striking manner than ever, how dangerous it is, notwithstanding our success, to be *principals* in a war on the continent of Europe, where we seem to agree, we should be concerned only by collateral connexions.

If heaven has so ordained, that we must often meet the French in bloody contests, I grant you, *we, or them, shall be one day humbled to the dust.* Will it most probably be that nation which leaves nothing to providence, and by the strength of their own arm says, *so it shall be;* or *that* which all the world sees is a friend to mankind, and has no principle interwoven in the constitution of their government, or the tempers of their people, to disturb the repose of the world, or lead them to aspire at conquest? Consult history, and see how this may probably happen.

Don't be frightened so much about *Fish.* I grant it to be a great object; but consider, that, except the surprize of Newfoundland (which I apprehend may be recovered without much difficulty) we are, by our possessions, become masters of those seas. The formidable fortress of Louisburgh, the Pondicherry of North America, is now level with the earth. Acadia is no longer inhabited by French subjects or neutrals. We have a fair prospect of the *secure possession* of a vast and puissant empire, in addition to these realms, and I hope may enjoy a long and uninterrupted peace.

If

If we mean to be a nation of *philosophers*, *patriots*, and *merchants*, as well as warriors, let us contemplate our own advantages, as well as comment on those of our neighbors. Let us turn our thoughts how to improve those advantages which we have so indisputable a claim to, and check our inclination for encrease of dominion.

To argue from common principles, France will not be afraid of our renewing the war in a short time, if we shew all the world that conquest is not our object. She will not in despair meditate the surprizing us. We may tempt her indeed, if we exhaust ourselves, or neglect the preservation of our *ships*, our *seamen*, or our *militia*.

It is a strong reason for peace, that if we spin out our wars to a great length, we must unavoidably teach all the nations of Europe, our manner of working and fighting ships: and as Peter the Great said of Charles XII. of Sweden; "My brother Charles will teach me to "beat him:" we shall be in danger of teaching the people of other countries to beat us, not only by observing wherein our excellencies

4

consist,

confist, but by the skill foreigners acquire by being employed in the king's ships.

Our fund of men is far from being inexhaustible. We cannot breed up men half so fast as we consume and wear them out. What we have done is beyond belief. Who amongst us, six years ago, thought it possible we could have held out so long in so many different parts of the world, without being absolutely obliged to give up for want of fighting men, or for want of husbandmen and manufacturers ?

We ought to have it *constantly and steadily* at heart, that we are to look forward, and lay it down as a principle, that the longer time our wars are spun out, the worse condition we shall be in, when peace is restored, as to the two essential articles, in peace and war. There is a measure in all things. Nature has fixed bounds. If the bow is pulled too tight, it will break, or lose its elastic power. If in good time we apply ourselves to the arts of peace, we shall be again strengthened for war, if it becomes necessary. In the political idea of *necessity*, it now seems to turn on the side of *peace with all the nations engaged in war.*

We

Are you *suspicious* of ourselves, that we shall not act consistently? Recent experience indeed proves that the more we exhaust ourselves in war, the more supine we become in peace. This cuts like a two-edged sword, and as sharply when we are successful, as when we are unfortunate: but the *remedy* is in our own hands, and shall we complain that it is not sought for, before the *crisis* is come for the use of it? We imagined, that the marine of France was nearly ruined in the last war; she repaired *her loss*, and we neglected *our gain*. Our parcimony and supineness went such lengths with regard to our own ships and seamen, after the conclusion of the *last war*, that we tempted our enemies to meet us at sea; and so far invited the *present war*. Do you imagine we shall commit the same fault again? I presume we understand our interest better than we did at that time: If we do not, what will *conquest* signify; and if we do, we have much to *hope* for, and very little to *fear*.

You say, *Why should we make conquests, if we are to restore them immediately?* This is a very familiar question, but the answer is not less obvious: War is a state of *offensive action* on one side or other. If an enemy will not comply with the conditions proposed by the party which
has

has acquired the ascendancy, such party must conclude the superiority does not reach to such a pitch, as enables him to prescribe conditions. The enemy must therefore be still further distressed: And how is this to be done but by taking his ships, dominions, towns, or strong holds? But if we fix our eyes on our neighbours goods more than on our own, we shall never be contented, or know when we have filled up that measure of war, which human prudence requires at our hands.

Again, if *peace* was desirable last year, is it not more so, *now* that we have more enemies on our backs? We have since that time made a conquest or two of such importance that perhaps we may command a peace. Is not this the very object we aspired at?

If we look back no farther than the last sessions, we shall find it to be the sense of parliament, that we had supported the war long enough, provided our enemies would acquiesce in what was then thought a *reasonable peace*: The fact is, our enemies would not *then* acquiesce; *now* it seems as if they would.

E

I grant

I grant, *that they perceive the improbability of being able to carry their point, and do not know what lengths we may go, if they force war on us, who have the ascendancy.* To this I answer, there certainly are reasons which induce them to offer such terms as our government may accept; but it is nevertheless evident, that they know the value of the object we have gained by the war.

You say, *that we have been at an additional expence since last year, and therefore ought to be reimbursed by some additional advantages.* This is very good reasoning between man and man in a court of equity; but do you really think it holds between nations, where all are supposed to be at as great an expence as they can bear? One immediately suspects the falacy of an argument, when it is put to such an issue. Indeed men judge according to their conceptions, and often times compare things which are quite different in their nature.

If you consider *only* how, or in what manner we have succeeded in so many instances, whilst in the *meridian* of our power, you will as surely overlook our *present* situation, and forget what our ability may be *hereafter*.

You

You say, *why not carry on a defensive war?* Do you think a defensive war, at such a vast expence, can answer? We shall not only exhaust the remainder of our *men*, our *money*, and our *credit*, but our spirits also. We have not *constancy* enough to *support* such a trial; and, I hope, *too much sense* to make it. We must go on hazarding the events of *offensive war*, or accept of *peace*. In the mean while, in either case of offensive or defensive war, if storms, or rocks, noxious climates, common mortality, discontent at home, or any disaster, stop our career, we may happen to stand aghast, and be confounded. We are apt to go into extremes! It is also far from impossible, but that some additional enemy might interfere, and being weakened, we may be robbed of the fruits of our former victories: And for ages to come make a bad figure as a nation.

You are impatient at this kind of reasoning: You say, *it proves a great deal too much*. My dear Sir, the object is no less than the *happiness* of our country, if not the *existence* of it. Whatever scheme of war is not absolutely *necessary*, ought to be considered in all the shapes which *time* can give it. I should likewise think it proved too much, if I did not see this *arduous*

struggle, this bloody and expensive war, brought to so decent an issue ; and by the great indulgence of Providence, the end of our wishes crowned in the most essential points ; and I will be bold to say, in the most marvellous manner !

You say, *Are we who are victors in so eminent a degree to sue for terms of peace ?* I do not know that *we* do sue for them. To express a readiness to accept equitable terms is to deal nobly. No nation can disguise its real situation so much, but that an equivocal conduct may be discovered. The king has declared to us, and all the world, that he pursued the war only with a view to a secure peace. Such conduct satisfies the minds of other princes, and we ourselves receive the satisfaction of seeing that our government have some end in view, and do not make war wantonly.

But you say, *Suppose no terms that we deem reasonable, are submitted to by our enemies.*—Why then, my friend, you and I may immediately break up *our* congress. I hope we shall then, in the language of the poet,

Cry havoc ! and let loose our dogs of war.

I hope

I hope we shall continue to fight on, as it were out of mere humanity ; without relaxing in the smallest degree, and, if possible, with redoubled care and vigor. And this not because of *clamor*, but that it appears just and fit, of the two evils to chuse the least. It may then become prudent, and warrantable to fight on, lest we should suffer the reproach of *receiving* laws, when in all reason we ought to *give* them ; or, what is still worse, be insulted by an enemy, whom despair alone renders capable of contesting any longer. Submissions on our part, not consistent with common decency for them to require, would expose us to the contempt of other nations, and render a peace precarious by destroying our *reputation*, not only for *courage* and *skill in arms*, but likewise for *common sense* and *reason*.

I believe with you, that the insolence and vivacity so peculiar to *the French* nation, and the inconstancy which characterises *ours*, joined to the folly or iniquity which has at some periods prevailed, have more than once imposed on us, at the making a peace : But for this very same reason I conclude, they will not now deceive his Majesty, or his present ministers and council. Why should you imagine
there

there is *now* any want either of skill or patriotism among those, whose proper business it is to conduct such great national measures?

I abhor the politics of France, in regard to her arrogancy, insolence, and *infernal injustice* towards other nations in some cases, witness the recent instance of her conduct towards Portugal. But the French now seem to be more free than they were, and as far as their laws will permit them to act with freedom, may hereafter be less dupes to the ambition of their own court. It is certainly not their interest to be quarrelsome, and something may be expected from this cause, in the events of a peace. There are likewise some glimmerings of hope, that mankind in general will grow wiser. The Turks have adopted *Christian* precepts: Perhaps *Christians* will grow less fond of Mahomedan principles in regard to war!

Be this as it may, my opinion is, and I have thought very seriously on the subject, that *twenty or thirty millions sterling, saved to this nation, or the interest thereon for half a century to come*, which is no absurd calculation, is, without a shadow of doubt, more valuable to us than Martinico, or even Cuba. I believe my country
will

will be not the richer only, but happier, and more secure, without these places than with them, considering the cost, and other terms on which the quiet possession of them can be purchased and retained.

We shall never be all of *one mind*; but I hope we shall be wise enough, when we *differ*, to avoid running into *faction*. If it happens otherwise on the present occasion, it will do us more *mischief* than any acquisitions can do us good. Let us be *virtuous*, and all will be well: And if we are *not virtuous*, conquest will not save us from ruin. Conquest will not prevent corruption, but rather create it; for if we were exalted by any real or imaginary advantage, such as the objects in question are esteemed, instead of becoming provident, serious, and zealously attached to the public welfare, we should be the more inclined to think there is *no need of caution*. We should be the more disposed to abandon ourselves to luxury; and in the same proportion as we are so abandoned, venality will always take root in our hearts, and flourish.

Too great affluence is dangerous to nations, as well as to individuals. This is a hard doctrine, but it is a true one. Do not understand

stand, that I would decline the holding all our conquests *wholly* and *entirely* on the supposition of such consequences. This might be *refining* too much; but in addition to the several reasons already urged, against our being impatient if they should be returned, I am *firmly persuaded in my own heart*, there is really a much greater mixture of *evil* in them, than you, and many thousand others, imagine; *abstracted* from the capital mischief of protracting the war on *their account*.

We shall *see* ere long what is to happen. If peace should not be obtained, we shall have an opportunity of knowing if those who are clamorous for war, will, rather than yield up certain conquests, acquiesce in such measures as may secure us against the evils of it, with regard to *money*.

In the mean while, I desire you will recollect, that the *supreme magistrate* has declared from the throne, and he has always acted agreeably to his declaration, that he would maintain our just rights in a manner becoming the dignity of his crown, and the welfare of his people. I grant, *that if we trace most human actions to their source, we shall find they arise from the temper and passions of men*. And let us contemplate the portrait of
a prince

a prince of a good understanding, well cultivated, with a generous humane temper; governing a brave, ingenious, learned people; treating them on all occasions with the utmost tenderness and regard, and consulting them in all things, as far as is consistent with his own prerogatives, which *their* interest requires *he* should preserve sacred, for the support of monarchical government.—Let us compare such a prince with one of a martial, haughty, imperious disposition, leading him to delight in war.—Which of these two characters do you conceive would bid fairest to make such a country as this, great, secure, respectable, and happy?

In regard to ministers, let me also recommend to you to reflect a moment, and ask yourself one candid question: Who have *our* kings, or any other people's kings, generally selected to place their confidence in, but such men as were disposed to favor their inclinations? Indeed what is the true measure of friendships in common life, but similarity of sentiment? All we can wish for; all there is much ground to expect of human virtue, is to render our passions so far subservient to reason, that we may promote the happiness of others. To make this our *pleasure*, to make this our *joy*, is the most essen-

tial part of true religion, and must ultimately terminate in our own happiness.

Now, what can you, or any impartial man, suppose to be the ruling passion of the Sovereign in question? Is it not the love of his country? Is it not the love of true glory, as founded in virtue and the happiness of his subjects? What can so good a man have at heart, but the solid welfare of his dominions? In the meanwhile the rectitude and steadiness of his mind, are such as must lead him to abhor any plan of government, which makes corruption a necessary concomitant. Does not the *true* honor of majesty blush, *my friend*, at the thought of such servile submissions as venality renders necessary? And is it not apparent that he will set his face against it?—This is the great object on which the future glory of our country must depend: and the lustre of the throne can only direct our steps, and guide us through the intricate maze.

Those who think a venal plan the only practicable one, will treat all other thoughts of government as chimerical. Upon this principle we must expect that some will express an impatience, which will shew itself in *clamor*
against

against the peace; but we might also hear the same *against the war*. In the mean while our brave countrymen, under the appearance of what is due to their valor, and the merit derived from success, may conclude, that it is fit they should be permitted, if they cannot otherwise retain certain favorite conquests, to shed their blood for a few years longer.

Thus under a notion of being GREAT *abroad*, where millions of us never go, we may injure ourselves *at home*, where our true happiness centers.—Thus the king's choice of a minister may also be objected to, not really for such minister's want of integrity or abilities, nor for his not being an Englishman born, but because he will do, all in his power, to preserve his fellow-subjects, and prevent their becoming martyrs to a mistake in politics.

You say, *this minister is ambitious; he should not have accepted of the first office*. Is it not glorious to be ambitious of serving our country? All beyond this is indeed unworthy of *a man*. Are you sure he could have served it, effectually, and according to his master's mind, fairly and above board, in any other office? *But he should not have accepted it, being a Scotchman*. My dear

friend, who ever really thought that a *Scotchman* can have no natural powers to conduct the affairs of our treasury, as well as an *Englishman*?

As to the *notion* about partiality : for the very reason that this minister is a North Briton, he will be the more guarded in respect to an equitable division of court-favors. And if he wages war with venality, he must necessarily consider the *state* in the first place, and those who enjoy offices, only as instrumental to this great end of government. Let us wait the issue !

But if there is a degree of partiality inseparable from all minds, is it not natural for a man to have the most, for those who are most nearly related to him ? *Where our treasure is, there will be our hearts.* This minister's lady is an Englishwoman. His children, I believe, are all English born. Their possessions are in England, and very large. Was it only for the stake he has himself, would he subscribe to any measure but such as tended to the good of the *whole*, of which himself and his children compose a *considerable part* ? If any of us are *really* deceived so egregiously, they may depart from principles ingrafted into the human soul, and insist, that to save a part from present inconveniences,

veniences, he will not regard the whole; but they may as well suppose a man who has one of his legs mortified, would chuse to keep it on, though he must infallibly lose both, if nothing worse ensued.

As to the *nationality of the Scotch*, or more properly *their prejudice in favor of each other*, it proceeds from a good cause, though it is sometimes attended with bad effects, in regard to the jealousy it occasions on our part. This evil will cease in proportion as North Britons intermarry with us; and this must happen in the same degree as their *men* live in England, more than their *women*, which I suppose is five to one: and I never yet heard of a North Briton, but had too much understanding to object to the wealth, beauty, or virtue of an English woman, because she was English. It will also cease as the English buy land in Scotland, and the Scotch in England. For my own part, I wish they were *less fond* of England, because I think the cultivation of Scotland should be their primary consideration; for it is evident, that in proportion as Scotland grows rich, Great Britain grows rich; and Great Britain happens to be your country and mine. The Scotch may then contribute more towards the support of the

state in a pecuniary view. In the mean while, they are most liberal of their blood, in the common cause of both kingdoms. And the wise precautions long since taken, gives the most undisciplined highlander a relish of property, and consequently of submission to government: This will be a source of wealth.

If you imagine, that the same rule of conduct governs ministers, as directs private men, I fancy you are mistaken; for in proportion as they are wise, they will consider what is for the good of the *whole*, and what is best for their own *honor, peace, and security*, not the gratification of individuals.

Further, the minister in question, if I am rightly informed, was actually bred in a school in England: And we all know, that his *master* is an *Englishman born*: and to convince the world, and all his subjects, that *he* has no illiberal or contracted ideas, he tells us, in so many words, he glories in the name of *Briton*. May not Scotchmen glory in the same appellation? And do you think any of them are such fools as to imagine their country could make any figure, in these *times*, but as it is connected with England?

Thank

Thank heaven our Sovereigns are kings of England and Scotland : And surely it will happen, that a man born in the North of Britain will sometimes be in the particular confidence of the Sovereign. Let us not do injustice, *even in jest* : Scotland has contributed an ample share to the obtaining the successes of the present war. Her people are brave : Her blood has been spilt : We could not have accomplished what has been done without her. It is by the united efforts of Great Britain and Ireland (which last I beg you will also not forget) that we have atchieved such wonders ! And will any man who has the head or heart of a Briton, pretend, that no Scotchman ought to preside at the Treasury ? What happy issue could such a maxim be attended with, in regard to the solid and indissoluble union of both kingdoms ?

You are an *Englishman* ! Whatever notions you may have of *persons* or *things*, you will not condemn a fellow-subject for faults before they are committed : You confess, that *this has been so much the case in regard to the minister in question, that it makes you blush to think, that we who are so brave, so generous a people, should on any occasion deviate from our character.* Could this be
esteemed

esteemed more than the effect of *party clamor*, or *thoughtless invective*, it would indeed fully the glory of our victories, to attempt to injure a fellow-subject, whom so amiable a king delights to honor !

Do you imagine this minister does not act in concert with others ? Are not the most approved counsellors, men who have themselves much at stake, the king's most faithful servants, and the true friends of their fellow-subjects, upon solid constitutional principles, are not these embarked in the same cause ?

We must make allowances : *Nations* as well as *individuals*, in every clime, are of a mixed character : *We* are remarkably so : Thank heaven our *virtues* preponderate. It is not strange that a rapid current of success should a little intoxicate some of us. We are all *great* by the achievements of our countrymen : it is right we should think so. But *modesty* is the characteristic of *bravery*. As to the *play-things* which are hung up in shops, to make passengers laugh, they are not of the most *civil kind*, nor civilly intended ; but they show our genius, that when our *hands are in*, we do not
like

like to *give up*; and that our enemies may repent, if they *trifle* with us.

Those who have long enjoyed the emoluments of *court-favor*, and basked in the warmth of ministerial partiality, may be reluctant to a change, but no one, in our time, has shown more moderation; or as far as can be yet known, adopted principles more consistent with a solid plan of public happiness and future security, than the present minister. Let us see what he will do in peace, if *peace* should be now the reward of our toils in war.

If we show the same spirit in peace, as we have done in war, we shall continue a great nation; if not, we shall sink in proportion. How many spots in this island lie barren!---How few schemes of population are promoted!—How lukewarm are many teachers of religion!—If instead of laying waste countries abroad, we cultivate every spot at home; and instead of destroying the species, we encourage the breed of them, and teach them how to be happy, we shall have very little to fear from *peace*, though much is to be dreaded even from *successful war*.

Consider these matters well; and let me know what you think when we meet again. In the mean while, if you have a mind to do a real service to your country, and maintain that grandeur which flatters your heart, and that security, which, upon your own principle, will render your life the more comfortable, and the more *glorious*, turn your thoughts to the *encrease of our seamen in time of peace, as we are sure our enemies will do of theirs*. It would be happy if every man of us could live familiarly on the water! And, above all, consult the preservation of those to whom we are so much obliged, and who may wish for employment when the war is finished. This you may do in some instances, without invading any man's province.

Take care of foldiers, to return them to their home, in a proper manner, that they may not, *beg their bread in realms which their valour has saved*, but put them in a way of securing bread to themselves and their families, without burthening parishes. Assist those who are inclined to assist themselves, and give them no cause to curse their country.

Now

Sept. 16,

Now, my friend, I know your good sense, and politeness, will triumph over all prejudices. If I *err* by being *too serious*, you will correct me. You had rather I should mistake from the impulse of a good principle than a bad one. Whether *peace* or *war* be our lot at present, we are all sure there is generally virtue in submitting to *government*. If it should be *war*, we shall *all hope to make our enemies pay the cost*. In the mean while, if you and I should still differ in opinion, let me prevail on you to suspend your final decision.

I have also another favor to ask, which you will readily grant; that in forming your estimate of my judgment, or my heart, on this occasion, you will carry something to my credit on the score of humanity; something to the love of my country; and, I suppose, that something may be due to observation, and common sense: And in all circumstances be assured that,

I am, most sincerely,

Sept. 16, 1762.

Your very true friend and servant.
